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NOT ALL PLEA BREACHES ARE EQUAL: 
EXAMINING HEREDIA’S EXTENSION OF 
IMPLICIT BREACH ANALYSIS 
Kevin Arns 
ABSTRACT—When the government enters into a plea agreement with a 
criminal defendant that stipulates that the government will give a specific 
sentence recommendation in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea, it 
can implicitly breach that agreement by clearly distancing itself from the 
recommendation at the sentencing hearing. In most circuits, the implicit 
breach of a non-court-binding plea agreement—an agreement where the 
defendant is bound to the guilty plea even if the court rejects the sentence 
recommendation—entitles defendants to a remedy. However, in 2014, the 
Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to hold that a defendant is entitled to a 
remedy when the government implicitly breaches a court-binding plea 
agreement—an agreement where the defendant is only bound to the guilty 
plea if the court accepts the plea agreement’s sentence recommendation. 
This Note examines whether the same implicit breach analysis used 
for non-court-binding plea agreements should be applied to court-binding 
plea agreements. To examine this question, this Note balances the actual 
harms imposed on criminal defendants by an implicit breach in each 
context against the potential impact increased appellate scrutiny may have 
on prosecutors’ ability to fulfill their duties as ministers of justice. 
Ultimately, this Note concludes that court-binding plea agreements should 
not be subject to the same implicit breach analysis and, at the very least, 
should be subject to harmless error analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the practice of plea bargaining first developed in the United 
States in the nineteenth century, it has been met with sharp criticism by 
many in the legal community.1 Critics have contended that plea bargaining 
grants too much discretion to prosecutors, is coercive in nature, and 
frustrates the truth-seeking objective of the criminal justice system.2 
Nonetheless, the practice of plea bargaining quickly developed into 
the primary means of resolving criminal prosecutions,3 and now accounts 
for approximately ninety-five percent of criminal convictions annually.4 
The practice has thrived despite its legions of detractors because it 
facilitates the efficient adjudication of criminal cases, enabling the 
 
1 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1979) (noting 
that the Supreme Court was poised to invalidate the practice of plea bargaining in its early years). 
2 See RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING 1–4 (2011); see also Kenneth Kipnis, 
Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93 (1976). For a discussion of the various 
collateral factors that influence the plea bargaining process, see generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea 
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004). 
3 Alschuler, supra note 1, at 6. 
4 LIPPKE, supra note 2, at 1; Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and 
the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 866 (2004). 
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government to consistently pursue enforcement of its myriad criminal 
statutes despite its limited resources.5 Without the efficiency of plea 
bargaining, the United States’ already overburdened criminal justice system 
would likely be forced to abandon the adjudication of several crimes at the 
expense of public safety and the legitimacy of the criminal code.6 
More recently, the federal government has begun to leverage the 
efficiencies of plea bargaining to increase its enforcement of its 
immigration policy. Specifically, in light of the dramatic increase in 
suspected illegal reentry, the Attorney General authorized the use of “fast-
track” plea agreements by U.S. Attorneys to prosecute immigrants that 
were previously deported and illegally reentered the United States in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.7 
The fast-track plea agreement requires defendants to plead guilty prior 
to being indicted, in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a 
reduced sentence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.8 Notably, if the 
sentencing court accepts the plea agreement, the sentencing 
recommendation is binding on the court.9 However, if the court rejects the 
agreement, defendants retain their right to revoke their plea.10 This differs 
from the non-court-binding plea agreements used in most federal and state 
criminal cases, which permit the trial court to accept the defendant’s guilty 
plea while retaining the discretion to impose any sentence.11 
The Department of Justice’s use of fast-track plea agreements has 
proven effective as it has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of 
 
5 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA 23–32 (2003) (discussing the development of plea bargaining as an efficient and effective 
means of enforcing local liquor laws); Alschuler, supra note 1, at 6 (“[Plea bargaining] was 
accompanied and probably aided by the substantive expansion of the criminal law, particularly the 
enactment of liquor-prohibition statutes.”). 
6 Cf. Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government Promises: A Contract-Based Approach to 
Enforcing Plea Bargains, 38 N.M. L. REV. 159, 161–63 (2008) (discussing the efficiency of plea 
bargaining and the burden that would be imposed in its absence); Warren Burger, The State of the 
Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970) (“A reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty 
pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities—judges, court reporters, 
bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.”). 
7 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys, 
Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or “Fast-Track” Prosecution 
Program in a District (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], reprinted in 16 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 134 (2003). While most immigration offenses are subject to civil penalties, § 1326 cross-
references Title 18 of the U.S. Code, subjecting offenders to criminal penalties. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 
(2012). 
8 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 7. 
9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
10 Id. 11(c)(5)(B). 
11 See id. 11(c)(1)(B). 
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criminal illegal reentry prosecutions and convictions.12 However, since its 
inception, it has faced widespread criticism and even constitutional 
challenges in the circuit courts.13 While the general practice has withstood 
all of the constitutional challenges to date, the Ninth Circuit sought to reign 
in the practice in 2014 when it examined the due process rights of a 
defendant who entered into a fast-track plea agreement. 
In United States v. Heredia, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor 
implicitly breached the fast-track plea agreement by filing a sentencing 
memo that detailed the defendant’s criminal history, even though the 
prosecutor agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.14 Unlike an explicit breach where the prosecutor 
overtly acts in a manner that violates the terms of the plea agreement, an 
implicit breach occurs when the prosecutor superficially abides by the 
terms of the agreement but covertly seeks to undermine a benefit conferred 
on the defendant by the terms of the agreement.15 Prior to Heredia, several 
circuits held that non-court-binding plea agreements can be implicitly 
breached;16 however, none of the circuits had ever considered whether a 
prosecutor can implicitly breach a court-binding plea agreement.17 
Heredia chartered new waters by holding that the assessment of an 
alleged implicit breach of a court-binding, fast-track plea agreement should 
be the same as non-court-binding plea agreements.18 Moreover, Heredia 
held that such a breach is automatically reversible error—meaning that 
 
12 See United States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 2014); Abe Cho, Note, Lowering 
Sentences for Illegal Immigrants? Why Judges Should Have Discretion to Vary from the Guidelines 
Based on Fast-Track Sentencing Disparities, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 447, 459–60 (2010). In 
addition to emphasizing the use of fast-track plea agreements, commentators have highlighted the 
attendant increase in department resources dedicated to immigration offenses and overall prioritization 
of curbing illegal immigration along the border regions as contributing factors to the significant 
increase in illegal reentry prosecutions. See, e.g., Patrick Kirby Madden, Note, Illegal Reentry and 
Denial of Bail to Undocumented Defendants: Unjust Tools for Social Control of Undocumented Latino 
Immigrants, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 339, 350–51 (2014) (discussing Los Angeles 
County’s allocation of county resources to support federal illegal reentry prosecutions and the federal 
government’s hardline position concerning the decision to prosecute under “Operation Streamline”). 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Litteral, 910 F.2d 547, 551–53 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing four 
constitutional challenges advanced by a defendant sentenced under the Guidelines); ACLU, REFORM 
U.S. APPROACH TO BORDER PROSECUTIONS, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
14_7_3_aclu_streamline_recommendations_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9RB-LPS8]; Jane L. 
McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox of Early 
Disposition Programs: A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 523 (2006). 
14 768 F.3d at 1224. 
15 See, e.g., State v. Poole, 394 N.W.2d 909, 910–11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Cachucha, 484 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269–71 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 377–78 (4th Cir. 
1974). 
17 See Heredia, 768 F.3d at 1230–31. 
18 Id. at 1232–35. 
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upon a finding of a breach on appellate review, the sentence must 
automatically be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court.19 The 
court asserted that the breach is not curable because any remedial action 
taken by the prosecutor after the alleged breach would be insufficient to 
overcome the harm done by the breach.20 Accordingly, a finding of breach 
is not subject to harmless error analysis—a separate assessment by the 
appellate court of whether the breach (error) likely prejudiced the 
defendant—prior to granting relief. 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding potentially challenges the efficiency of 
the fast-track plea bargaining process by subjecting the process to a higher 
level of scrutiny by appellate courts. Given the federal government’s heavy 
reliance on plea agreements, particularly fast-track plea agreements,21 for 
criminal enforcement, a heightened level of appellate scrutiny will impact 
the criminal justice system with an overwhelming breadth. Accordingly, it 
is imperative that the costs of heightened scrutiny be fully understood and 
appropriately balanced against any potential gain. 
The most notable and direct cost of heightened appellate scrutiny is 
the threat posed to prosecutors’ ability to make sentencing remarks once 
they have entered into a plea agreement. Specifically, the threat of appellate 
reversal may compel prosecutors to withhold relevant information from the 
sentencing court, including the prosecutors’ rationale for entering into the 
plea agreement, because the comments could be construed as undercutting 
the recommendation.22 If prosecutors are forced to stand mute before 
sentencing courts, the courts will lose a vital source of information that is 
essential to their ability to impose a fair and just sentence. 
In light of this cost and others, this Note examines whether traditional 
implicit breach analysis should be extended to fast-track plea agreements 
or, more broadly, any court-binding plea agreement. Further, this Note 
contends that the finding of an implicit breach should not be considered an 
automatic reversible error.23 Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s recent 
departure from its prior plea breach analysis and the Court’s indication that 
 
19 Id. at 1235–37. 
20 Id. 
21 Illegal reentry cases, which most commonly result in court-binding plea agreements, have 
become the most frequently prosecuted federal crime. See Jason D. Anton, Note, Defining “Found in”: 
Constructive Discovery and the Crime of Illegal Reentry, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2013). 
22 Shortly after Heredia, one prosecutor interpreted the heightened level of scrutiny as abridging his 
ability to respond to direct questions posed to him by the court during sentencing. See United States v. 
Torres, No. 14CR0890-LAB, 2014 WL 7176466, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014). 
23 As will be discussed in greater depth in Section I.B, all but a few trial and sentencing court errors 
are subject to harmless error analysis. This Note argues that an implicit plea breach should not be 
exempt from this analysis. 
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not all breaches constitute reversible error. Part II reviews the development 
of implicit breach doctrine for non-court-binding plea agreements on both 
the federal and state levels. Part III discusses the emergence of fast-track 
plea agreements and Heredia’s extension of implicit breach analysis to 
them. Finally, Part IV argues that fast-track plea agreements should not be 
subject to the same breach analysis as non-court-binding pleas, and that all 
court-binding plea breaches24 should be subject to harmless error analysis. 
I. A SHIFT IN APPELLATE BREACH ASSESSMENT 
Despite the practice of plea bargaining extending back to the early part 
of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court did not acknowledge the 
constitutionality of plea bargaining until 1970.25 At that time, the Court 
seemed to begrudgingly accept the practice as being necessary for the 
administration of the modern criminal justice system.26 Accordingly, the 
Court began to define the boundaries of plea bargaining and assess what 
rights and protections should be afforded to defendants who enter into a 
guilty plea. This Part will discuss the Court’s foundational assessment of a 
plea breach in Santobello v. New York27 and the subsequent ambiguity 
concerning a defendant’s remedial entitlements. Then, it will examine the 
implication of recent harmless error cases and the Court’s contemporary 
assessment of a plea breach in Puckett v. United States.28 
A. Santobello’s Ambiguous Breach Remedy 
Santobello established that the breach of a plea agreement entitles 
defendants to a remedy, but it failed to articulate the exact nature and 
requirements for that remedy. In Santobello, the Court focused on the 
importance of protecting a defendant’s rights in the event of an explicit 
breach of a sentencing recommendation.29 The prosecutor in Santobello 
 
24 While this Note focuses on fast-track plea agreements because this is the type of agreement 
involved in Heredia and is the most commonly used court-binding plea agreement for federal 
prosecutions, federal prosecutors have the authority to enter into a general court-binding plea agreement 
outside of the fast-track context. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
25 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (noting that plea bargaining could offer 
potential benefits to both the government and defendants, and that the Constitution does not forbid its 
practice); Alschuler, supra note 1, at 40. 
26 See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 204, 205 (1979). 
27 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
28 556 U.S. 129 (2009). 
29 404 U.S. at 264 (“[A] guilty plea is a serious and sobering occasion inasmuch as it constitutes a 
waiver of the fundamental rights to a jury trial, to confront one’s accusers, to present witnesses in one’s 
defense, to remain silent, and to be convicted by proof beyond all reasonable doubt.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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promised to make no recommendation at the sentencing hearing in 
exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea to a lesser-included offense.30 The 
defendant accepted the agreement and entered a binding guilty plea that he 
would be unable to withdraw absent the sentencing court’s discretionary 
approval.31 However, after a new prosecutor was assigned to the case, the 
new prosecutor explicitly breached the plea agreement by recommending 
that the defendant be sentenced to the maximum confinement time.32 
Despite the defendant’s objection to the breach, the court proceeded with 
sentencing after the prosecutor made his unequivocal recommendation,33 
leaving the defendant with no option to obtain a remedy for the breach 
other than filing an appeal. 
To define the defendant’s rights with respect to the plea agreement, 
Santobello borrowed basic contract law principles and asserted that “when 
a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”34 While this application of 
contract law’s manifestation of assent principle was clear and has been 
consistently acknowledged in subsequent cases,35 what was less clear was 
the burden imposed on a defendant to obtain relief for a breach and the 
exact remedy that should be afforded when that burden is met.36 
In large part, this lack of clarity stems from two omissions in 
Santobello. First, the Court did not specify the exact remedy that was to be 
afforded to the defendant. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the state 
court to determine if vacatur or specific performance would be more 
appropriate in this case.37 While some courts have interpreted this as 
affording the defendant a choice between these two remedies,38 the 
 
30 Id. at 258. 
31 See id. Defendant Santobello actually attempted to withdraw his guilty plea after his newly 
appointed counsel advised him that some crucial evidence may not be admissible due to the manner in 
which it was obtained, but the court denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at 258–59. 
32 Id. at 259. 
33 Id. at 259–60. 
34 Id. at 262. 
35 See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). 
36 See generally Peter Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea 
Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978) (noting Santobello’s failure to provide lower courts with clear 
guidance concerning appropriate remedies for plea breaches, and evaluating the potential implications a 
plea breach may have on a defendant’s constitutional rights and the attendant remedies that would be 
most appropriate). 
37 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263. 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2014); State v. Pope, 
564 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (“[W]here bad faith is found to exist, the court should give 
considerable weight to the choice of remedy sought by [the] defendant . . . .”). 
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allocation of a choice of remedy may be unnecessary and even 
inappropriate, depending on the interest that is being protected.39 
Second, even though Santobello articulated that the explicit breach in 
that case automatically entitled the defendant to relief, regardless of 
whether it influenced the judge’s sentencing decision, the Court did not 
specify general criteria for when a defendant is automatically entitled to 
relief.40 Further, Santobello articulated that a defendant does not have a 
right to plea bargain or have a plea agreement accepted by the trial court, 
but it also indicated that a breach of an enforceable plea agreement 
implicates a violation of a defendant’s due process rights.41 While one may 
interpret Santobello’s reference to due process rights and its refusal to 
apply harmless error analysis as an indication that an explicit breach of a 
sentencing recommendation always entitles a defendant to a remedy, 
Santobello’s failure to explicitly state this, and its assertion that defendants 
do not have a right to plea bargain, could logically lead one to conclude 
some breaches may be subject to harmless error analysis.42 Accordingly, 
Santobello leaves some ambiguity as to if and when a plea breach may be 
subject to harmless error analysis. While many circuits refuse to subject 
plea breaches to harmless error analysis when the defendant makes a timely 
objection to the alleged breach,43 the Eighth Circuit employs harmless error 
analysis regardless of whether the defendant objected.44 
B. Narrowing Appellate Protection for Breaches 
Since Santobello, the Court has taken affirmative steps to limit the 
scope of appellate protection afforded to defendants who enter into plea 
agreements, and has indicated in dicta that it may further limit these 
protections. With respect to initially entering into plea agreements, the 
 
39 See Westen & Westin, supra note 36, at 507–14 (noting that either vacatur or specific 
performance can sufficiently protect the defendant’s need to “intelligently” exercise the choice to plead 
guilty, but that only specific performance can adequately protect a defendant’s expectation interest). 
40 See 404 U.S. at 262–63. 
41 See id. at 262; Daniel Frome Kaplan, Comment, Where Promises End: Prosecutorial Adherence 
to Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 755 (1985) 
(discussing Mabry’s confirmation that the Court perceives “due process concerns [being] implicated in 
the process of enforcing a plea agreement”). 
42 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d 692, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Puckett v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141–42 (2009)) (discussing whether Santobello precludes plea breaches 
from being subject to harmless error analysis, and concluding that it left the specific requirements for a 
remedy as an open question).  
43 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Correale v. United 
States, 479 F.2d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 1973)). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 584 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. E.V., 
500 F.3d 747, 754–55, 755 n.13 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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Court clarified that a prosecutor reserves the right to withdraw from the 
agreement prior to the trial court’s acceptance of the plea.45 Since 
defendants do not have a right to plea bargain with the government, and 
defendants do not officially sacrifice their “liberty or any other 
constitutionally protected interest” prior to the court’s acceptance of their 
guilty plea, a prosecutor’s initial promise has not induced the defendant to 
detrimentally sacrifice any right.46 Further, a clearly rescinded plea offer 
does not compromise the voluntariness or intelligence of a subsequent 
guilty plea.47 Thus, the Court’s protection of defendants who engage in plea 
bargaining varies based on the sacrifices defendants have actually incurred 
at a given stage of the plea bargaining process. 
Most recently, in Puckett v. United States, the Court clearly articulated 
that the breach of a plea agreement is not “structural” error.48 A structural 
error is an error that “necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally 
unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”49 
Accordingly, proof of a breach alone is not sufficient to warrant an 
automatic remedy. Instead, in certain situations, a defendant may bear the 
additional burden of proving that the breach was not harmless.50 
In Puckett, the defendant was induced to plead guilty, in part, by the 
prosecutor’s promise to recommend an offense-level reduction that would 
have significantly reduced the amount of prison time the defendant would 
be eligible for under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.51 However, after 
the defendant entered his binding guilty plea with the court, the prosecutor 
explicitly breached the plea agreement by filing a sentencing addendum 
that unambiguously recommended that the court not give the defendant the 
offense-level reduction because he committed another crime after the plea 
agreement was made.52 Notably, while defendant’s counsel made a general 
objection to the prosecutor’s new recommendation in the addendum, 
counsel failed to “object [at sentencing] that the Government was violating 
 
45 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 506–08 (1984). 
46 See id. at 507, 510–11 (“The Due Process Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecutors; its 
concern is with the manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty.”). 
47 See id. at 510. 
48 556 U.S. 129, 140–41 (2009). 
49 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999). 
50 Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141–42 (2009) (“The defendant whose plea agreement has been broken by 
the Government will not always be able to show prejudice, either because he obtained the benefits 
contemplated by the deal anyway (e.g., the sentence that the prosecutor promised to request) or because 
he likely would not have obtained those benefits in any event (as is seemingly the case here).”). 
51 Id. at 131. The difference between the low end of the Guidelines range with the offense-level 
reduction and without the reduction was seventy-four months. See id. at 132–33. 
52 See id. at 132. 
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its obligations under the plea agreement by backing away from its request 
for the reduction.”53 After review by the Supreme Court, Puckett held that a 
plea breach is subject to plain error review—which includes an assessment 
of whether there was a clear or obvious error and whether it was 
harmless—if the defendant fails to object to the breach in a timely 
fashion.54 
In Puckett’s rejection of the idea that a plea breach is necessarily 
prejudicial to a defendant, the Court noted that a breach may be curable. 
Puckett articulated that the breach itself does not impact the voluntary and 
intelligent nature of the defendant’s decision to plead guilty; rather, it 
merely means the prosecutor has failed to fulfill a contractual obligation.55 
Since the nature of the plea is not impacted, the filing of a timely objection 
may induce the prosecution to take action to fulfill its obligation under the 
agreement, curing the alleged breach.56 If the prosecution refuses, the trial 
court then has the ability to “grant an immediate remedy [for the breach] 
(e.g., withdrawal of the plea . . . ) and thus avoid the delay and expense of a 
full appeal.”57 By emphasizing the ability to immediately cure a breach, 
Puckett appears to be trying to protect the efficient nature of plea 
bargaining—which is the primary attribute that justifies its practice—by 
limiting the need for and authorization of appellate court intervention.58 
While these clear declarations about curability and nonstructural error 
illustrate the limited scope of breaches that are subject to automatic reversal 
 
53 Id. at 133; see also Brief for the United States at 8–9, Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 
(2009) (No. 07-9712). 
54 556 U.S. at 134–36. 
55 Id. at 137–38. 
56 Id. at 140. 
57 Id. 
58 Similarly, the majority of the circuits have promoted the efficiency of plea bargaining by 
upholding the validity of various appealability waivers in plea agreements. See, e.g., United States v. 
Allison, 59 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 
980 F.2d 582, 583 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by 38 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Melancon, 
972 F.2d 566, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 896 (2d Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829–30 (8th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by United 
States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003); cf. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th 
Cir. 1993) (noting that most appealability waivers will be upheld on appeal, despite invalidating the 
waiver in the case). Generally, when defendants sign an appealability waiver, they waive the right to 
challenge either a particular stipulation in the agreement or their sentence via direct appeal unless they 
can assert that the plea agreement was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily or that they received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. These waivers protect the efficiency of the plea bargaining process by 
significantly reducing defendants’ ability to use appellate courts as a trial court for the plea process. The 
inclusion of appealability waivers in plea agreements became common in the 1990s in response to the 
notable increase in direct and collateral appeals filed by defendants that entered into plea agreements. 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(6) advisory committee’s note to 1999 amendment (acknowledging the 
increase in the use of waivers and the federal courts’ tendency to uphold their validity). 
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in accordance with Santobello, Puckett did not go as far to overrule 
Santobello’s holding that certain explicit breaches of a plea agreement 
automatically entitle a defendant to relief. However, Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, gave an indication that recent precedent concerning 
harmless error principles may demand a reexamination of Santobello.59 
Since Santobello, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that harmless error 
analysis is applicable to the vast majority of appeals, including “[a]ny 
error . . . which does not affect substantial rights” and is “simply an error in 
the trial process itself.”60 Such errors are not exempt from harmless error 
analysis because the impact of the error is quantifiable in the context of the 
other evidence that was presented against the defendant.61 Accordingly, a 
select few constitutional violations, such as the denial of counsel, avoid 
harmless error analysis,62 but most violations, including the admission of a 
coerced confession, do not.63 This raises the question of whether a 
defendant who enters into a plea agreement, which itself is not a 
constitutional right, should be afforded more protection—by way of having 
to meet a lower burden of proof on appeal—than a defendant who is 
compelled to stand witness against himself in the form of a coerced police 
confession, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right. 
II. COURT ANALYSIS OF IMPLICIT BREACHES 
Plea bargains often entail a sentence-recommendation bargain—the 
prosecutor agrees to make a specific sentencing recommendation to the 
court in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea.64 Usually, these 
sentencing recommendations are not binding on the court;65 however, the 
prosecutor’s recommendation is often influential in determining the 
sentence imposed.66 If a prosecutor makes a different recommendation than 
the one agreed to, or fails to make a recommendation at all, it is clear that 
the prosecutor has explicitly breached the agreement. What is much less 
 
59 Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141 n.3. 
60 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1999) (first alteration in original) (first quoting FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 52(a); and then quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). 
61 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08. 
62 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
63 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 311. 
64 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
65 See id. 11(c)(1)(B); see also, e.g., United States v. Gaertner, 593 F.2d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1979); 
People v. Pahlman, 366 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
66 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1912 (1992) (“[J]udges often give bargained-for sentences because of what prosecutors and defense 
lawyers do not say at sentencing; the sentencing hearing seems rigged to support the deal that the two 
attorneys have already struck.”); see also FISHER, supra note 5, at 131–33. 
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clear is whether a prosecutor implicitly breaches an agreement by making 
additional statements beyond the specific sentence recommendation about 
the defendant or the particular crime. This Part will examine how both the 
federal circuits and the state courts have addressed the issue of implicit 
breaches. Further, this Part will discuss the difficulty of balancing the need 
to protect a defendant from an implicit breach with the prosecutor’s duty to 
inform the sentencing court. 
A. Federal Court Implicit Breach Analysis 
Federal prosecutors are constrained by the dual obligation to (1) 
uphold the negotiated sentence recommendation and (2) fully inform the 
court of all facts relevant to sentencing. 
Generally, federal circuits have acknowledged that a prosecutor can 
implicitly breach a plea agreement by effectively arguing against the 
agreed-to sentencing recommendation. However, the circuits have applied 
varying levels of scrutiny to prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations. 
Under the old discretionary sentencing system, some circuits critically 
reviewed the tenor of prosecutors’ comments and conduct during the 
sentencing phase.67 For example, in United States v. Grandinetti, the Fifth 
Circuit articulated that a prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation needs to 
be “forceful and intelligent” to fulfill the plea agreement obligation.68 The 
Ninth Circuit went even further, imposing an implied-in-law requirement 
for the prosecutor to be “enthusiastic” in the articulation of a sentencing 
recommendation.69 
However, after the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,70 
the Supreme Court addressed circuits’ application of a high level of 
scrutiny to all sentencing recommendations. The Sentencing Reform Act 
sought to remedy the issue of widely disparate sentences being imposed by 
different federal judges for similar criminal conduct.71 The Act created the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission that was responsible for establishing 
Sentencing Guidelines to constrain judges’ sentencing discretion and 
 
67 See United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 
375, 377 (4th Cir. 1974) (“[I]t is manifest that the consideration which induced defendant’s guilty plea 
was not simply the prospect of a formal recitation of a possible sentence, but rather the promise that an 
Assistant United States Attorney would make a recommendation on sentencing.”). 
68 564 F.2d at 727. 
69 See United States v. Benchimol, 738 F.2d 1001, 1002 (9th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 471 U.S. 453 (1985) 
(per curiam). 
70 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
71 See Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor’s Duty to Seek Justice and the 
Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2000). 
ARNS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016 11:36 PM 
110:617 (2016) Not All Plea Breaches Are Equal 
629 
promote sentencing consistency.72 Since judges’ sentencing discretion is 
constrained by the ranges delineated in the Sentencing Guidelines,73 a 
federal prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation has a more limited 
potential to impact the sentence imposed.74 
Possibly due to this limited impact potential, the Court rejected the 
concept of an implied-in-law requirement that a recommendation be given 
enthusiastically.75 In United States v. Benchimol, the Court noted that a 
prosecutor is bound to uphold any explicit promises that were made 
regarding a sentence recommendation, including a promise to make a 
forceful or enthusiastic recommendation.76 However, the Court further 
noted that plea agreements do not inhere to them a demand of a high level 
of advocacy on the part of the prosecutor; the agreements simply require 
that the express terms be fulfilled and not undermined by the prosecutor’s 
conduct.77 In so holding, Benchimol referenced the inability of an appellate 
court to fairly assess a prosecutor’s level of advocacy from a transcript.78 
While Benchimol places some limit on the scrutiny applied to a 
prosecutor’s sentence recommendation, it does not clearly define the 
bounds of an implicit breach. Generally, circuit courts have articulated that 
a prosecutor must affirmatively make the negotiated sentencing 
recommendation and must avoid making comments that clearly undermine 
that recommendation.79 However, since federal prosecutors have a duty to 
 
72 Id.; see Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. 
Attorneys, Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and 
Sentencing Appeals (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft PROTECT Act Bluesheet], reprinted in 
15 FED. SENT’G REP. 375, 375 (2003). 
73 While strict adherence to the federal Sentencing Guidelines is no longer technically mandatory, 
the sentencing discretion of federal judges is still constrained by the Guidelines. See generally United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (precluding judges from imposing sentences that exceed the 
applicable guideline absent a jury determination that an aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable 
doubt or the defendant’s admission of the aggravating factor). 
74 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 66, at 1912 n.12 (“Sentencing in [Guidelines] jurisdictions does 
not depend on the prosecutor’s representations to the same extent as in discretionary sentencing systems 
because the guidelines often dictate a particular sentence.”). 
75 United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 456 (1985) (per curiam). 
76 Id. at 455–56. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 456 (noting that a prosecutor’s expression of personal reservations about a plea 
agreement “is quite a different proposition than an appellate determination from a transcript of the 
record made many years earlier that the Government attorney had ‘left an impression with the court of 
less-than-enthusiastic support for leniency’”). 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Cachucha, 484 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
prosecutor’s recommendation was undermined by his subsequent complaints about the inadequacy of 
the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Saling, 205 F.3d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 2000) (highlighting the 
prosecutor’s attempt to distance himself from the original agreement by discussing the defendant’s 
conduct in trial after the agreement was made); United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269–70 (1st Cir. 
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fully inform a sentencing court regardless of the terms of a plea agreement, 
appellate courts are saddled with the complicated task of parsing comments 
made solely for the purpose of informing the court with comments made to 
clearly undermine the recommendation.80 
As ministers of justice, federal prosecutors have an affirmative duty to 
ensure that sentencing courts make an informed decision.81 Society’s 
interest in just punishment and safety demands that this affirmative duty is 
not abridged.82 Thus, attorneys general have sought to codify this duty in 
recent “bluesheets.” 
In accord with the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines, attorneys 
general strive to promote consistency in the prosecution of criminal activity 
by issuing bluesheets that provide broad guidelines prosecutors must 
adhere to in their charging and plea negotiation decisions.83 These 
guidelines require all sentencing recommendations to honestly reflect the 
totality of a defendant’s conduct, and that prosecutors fully inform the 
sentencing court of all readily provable facts relevant to sentencing.84 This 
would include certain details about the particular crime and information 
about the defendant’s criminal history. A prosecutor’s divulgence of such 
relevant facts is paramount to ensuring the consistent sentencing of 
similarly situated defendants. 
This obligation to inform the court presents an issue with an implicit 
breach analysis because a prosecutor’s recitation of the relevant facts may 
be viewed as undermining the negotiated sentence recommendation. In 
fact, due to the adversarial nature of the adjudicatory process, almost any 
statement made by the prosecutor pertaining to the prosecuted crime or the 
 
1992) (asserting that the prosecutor’s expression of “material reservations about the agreement” served 
to “cut off the government’s agreement at the knees”). 
80 See Galin, supra note 71, at 1281 (discussing some courts’ refusal to force a prosecutor to uphold 
a plea agreement if it infringes on their duty to inform the court). 
81 See, e.g., Saling, 205 F.3d at 767 (“A prosecutor has the duty as an officer of the court to inform 
the court of all factual information relevant to the defendant’s sentence so that a sentence may be 
imposed based upon a complete and accurate record.”); United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he prosecutor was obligated to bring her conduct subsequent to conviction to the court’s 
attention: ‘[A]ny time a prosecutor is aware that the court is about to impose sentence based upon 
incomplete or inaccurate information, the prosecutor has the duty to inform the court of the correct or 
missing information.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Block, 660 F.2d 1086, 
1091 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981))). 
82 Cf. United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856–57 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he plea agreement did not 
restrict the court’s access to . . . information, nor could such an agreement properly do so.”). 
83 See, e.g., Ashcroft PROTECT Act Bluesheet, supra note 72, at 375–76; Memorandum from 
Janet Reno, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Holders of U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9, Principles 
of Federal Prosecution (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 352, 352 (1994). 
84 Ashcroft PROTECT Act Bluesheet, supra note 72, at 376 (noting that the Guidelines explicitly 
prohibit a federal prosecutor from being a “party to any plea agreement that results in the sentencing 
court having less than a full understanding of all readily provable facts relevant to sentencing”). 
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defendant’s criminal history could be viewed as an implied distancing from 
the sentence recommendation. 
In light of this issue, circuits have taken disparate approaches in 
balancing the prosecutors’ obligations to the defendant that entered into the 
plea agreement and the sentencing court. For example, the Eighth Circuit 
generally affords prosecutors a great deal of leeway in apprising the court 
of all relevant sentencing information as long as the prosecutor 
affirmatively makes the negotiated sentence recommendation. In United 
States v. Baker, after summarizing the defendant’s criminal conduct, the 
prosecutor stated, “They don’t get much worse than this, Your Honor. . . . 
[T]he defendant has made it abundantly clear by his own actions that he has 
a sexual preference for young children, and he’s never going to stop.”85 
But, after this statement, the prosecutor reaffirmed that the plea 
agreement’s recommended sentence was appropriate.86 Baker asserted that 
the prosecutor’s detailing of the facts of the crime and subsequent 
commentary on the conduct and defendant did not undermine the 
recommendation, despite being less-than-enthusiastic.87 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has been more critical in assessing the 
necessity of a prosecutor’s sentencing comments. The Ninth Circuit has 
asserted that if a prosecutor’s comment does not serve to provide the trial 
court with new information or correct a factual inaccuracy, it can be 
presumed that the comment was made to imply that a different sentence 
than the one recommended is warranted.88 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that a prosecutor’s restatement or unnecessary elaboration on 
information already contained in a presentence report can constitute an 
implicit breach of a plea agreement.89 
In short, while the circuits agree that a prosecutor implicitly breaches 
a plea agreement by clearly undermining a sentence recommendation, the 
extent to which this obligation constrains the prosecutor’s duty to inform 
the court varies amongst the circuits. 
B. State Court Implicit Breach Analysis 
Many state courts have similarly struggled to establish a clear standard 
for analyzing alleged implicit plea breaches that balances the prosecutor’s 
duties to the sentencing court and to the defendant. This Section will focus 
 
85 674 F.3d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012). 
86 Id. at 1067–68. 
87 Id. at 1068. 
88 See United States v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Mondragon, 228 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
89 Mondragon, 228 F.3d at 980–81. 
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on the evolution of implicit breach analysis for one state that has articulated 
a clear standard of review—Wisconsin.90 Unlike the federal system, 
Wisconsin employs a discretionary sentencing system, potentially enabling 
a prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation to have a more significant 
impact on the sentence imposed.91 Additionally, Wisconsin acknowledges a 
state constitutional right to the enforcement of plea agreements, but all 
sentence recommendations are nonbinding on the court.92 
For implicit breaches, Wisconsin appellate courts initially adopted the 
standard articulated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Brown—a 
sentence recommendation “that is something less than a neutral recitation 
of the product of the bargain—is a breach of the plea agreement.”93 In the 
first application of this standard in State v. Poole, the prosecutor presented 
the negotiated sentence recommendation to the court, but noted that the 
agreement was entered into prior to the state being aware of other instances 
of similar criminal conduct by the defendant.94 Poole articulated that 
couching the recommendation in a qualifying statement made the 
recommendation a less-than-neutral recitation and constituted a breach of 
the plea agreement.95 This indicated that the less-than-neutral standard may 
impose a rigid restriction on a prosecutor’s comments in connection with a 
negotiated sentence recommendation. 
However, since Poole, Wisconsin courts have taken a less critical 
approach in reviewing a prosecutor’s conduct in connection with fulfilling 
a plea agreement.96 Accordingly, subsequent Wisconsin cases have limited 
the level of scrutiny to be applied by appellate courts under the less-than-
neutral standard. The courts have consistently articulated that the less-than-
neutral standard prohibits prosecutors from clearly distancing themselves 
 
90 While Wisconsin’s sentencing scheme and rules of criminal procedure differ from that of the 
federal government, and the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution of 
criminal illegal reentry, Wisconsin’s long history of balancing the need to protect defendants from 
implicit breaches with the need to protect prosecutors’ ability to fulfill their duties, and its objective of 
increasing consistency in sentencing, can serve as a helpful comparison to the federal system. 
91 See State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197, 208–09 (Wis. 2004). 
92 State v. Williams, 637 N.W.2d 733, 741, 744 (Wis. 2002); State v. Smith, 558 N.W.2d 379, 385, 
389–90 (Wis. 1997). 
93 State v. Poole, 394 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (citing United States v. Brown, 
500 F.2d 375, 377–78 (4th Cir. 1974)). 
94 Id. at 909. 
95 Id. at 910–11. 
96 See, e.g., State v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12, 32–33 (Wis. 1986) (noting that not all plea agreement 
breaches warrant a remedy); State v. Howard, 630 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (same); cf. 
Williams, 637 N.W.2d at 740 (rejecting a “close case” standard of review for an appellate court’s 
analysis of an alleged implicit breach of a plea agreement). 
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from the negotiated sentence recommendation.97 For example, prosecutors 
clearly distance themselves from the negotiated recommendation when 
they recite an alternative sentence recommendation listed in the 
presentence investigation report (PSR)98 or emphasize that the negotiated 
sentence recommendation was made prior to the discovery of certain 
negative information about the defendant.99 However, the courts have also 
articulated that the prosecutors’ duty to fully inform the sentencing court 
authorizes them to convey relevant negative information about the 
defendant to the court without breaching the plea agreement.100 In fact, any 
plea agreement that would impede a prosecutor’s authority to convey such 
information contravenes Wisconsin’s public policy and will not be 
enforced by the court.101 
Most notably, in State v. Naydihor, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
asserted that a prosecutor is free to comment on the nature of the offense, 
the defendant’s character, and the rights of the public in presenting a 
negotiated sentence recommendation to the court.102 Naydihor analyzed an 
alleged implicit breach of a plea agreement that required the prosecutor to 
recommend probation, but did not stipulate the length of probation.103 At 
sentencing, the prosecutor recited portions of the PSR pertaining to the 
victim impact statement and the defendant’s substance abuse history.104 
Since this negative information was relevant to the nature of the offense 
and the defendant’s character, discussion of this information merely served 
to fully inform the court and did not constitute a less-than-neutral recitation 
of the agreement.105 
Overall, Wisconsin’s analysis of implicit breaches strives to avoid 
creating a rigid standard that impedes prosecutors’ duty to the sentencing 
court, and limits breaches to irrelevant, negative commentary that 
undermines the negotiated recommendation. 
 
97 See, e.g., Williams, 637 N.W.2d at 746; State v. Sprang, 683 N.W.2d 522, 529 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2004). 
98 Sprang, 683 N.W.2d at 529. 
99 Williams, 637 N.W.2d at 746. 
100 See, e.g., State v. Naydihor, 678 N.W.2d 220, 231 (Wis. 2004); State v. Hanson, 606 N.W.2d 
278, 283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); see also Williams, 637 N.W.2d at 745 (“At sentencing, pertinent factors 
relating to the defendant’s character and behavioral pattern cannot be immunized by a plea agreement 
between the defendant and the State.”). 
101 Williams, 637 N.W.2d at 745. 
102 678 N.W.2d at 230–31. 
103 Id. at 227–28. 
104 Id. at 226–27. 
105 See id. at 231. 
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III. IMPLICIT BREACH ANALYSIS EXTENDED TO FAST-TRACK PLEAS 
The federal and state implicit plea breach analysis has exclusively 
focused on non-court-binding plea agreements. This means the court is able 
to accept the defendant’s guilty plea, then disregard the negotiated sentence 
recommendation and impose a harsher sentence. Thus, the impact of the 
alleged implicit breach is only known to the parties after the defendant is 
bound to the guilty plea, and the defendant’s only means of obtaining an 
equitable remedy for the breach is through the appellate process. 
In contrast, fast-track pleas are court-binding plea agreements. This 
means that if the court accepts the plea agreement, it is bound to impose the 
recommended sentence.106 Thus, if an implicit breach occurs that induces 
the judge to reject the recommended sentence, the defendant is 
automatically entitled to rescind the guilty plea. 
This Part will begin by discussing the recent increase in fast-track plea 
agreements for immigration offenses. Then, it will examine the Ninth 
Circuit’s extension of implicit breach analysis to a fast-track plea 
agreement in Heredia. 
A. The Increased Use of Fast-Track Pleas 
The use of fast-track pleas has increased dramatically in recent years, 
representing a fundamental shift in immigration policy and adjudication. In 
1952, Congress made the illegal reentry of a previously deported alien a 
felony.107 To obtain a conviction under § 1326 a prosecutor only needs to 
prove that the defendant is (1) an alien, (2) that was previously deported, 
(3) who was found in the United States, and (4) did not have the Attorney 
General’s permission to reenter the United States.108 Since the defendant’s 
guilt is primarily contingent upon establishing the defendant’s immigration 
status, the only evidence needed to secure a conviction is usually readily 
available documentation of their status.109 Thus, the prosecutor’s need to 
 
106 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
107 See Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 276, 66 Stat. 163, 229 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012)). 
Prior to the passage of § 1326, immigration laws were enforced exclusively through civil proceedings. 
Despite the criminalizing of illegal reentry, the number of civil removal proceedings still outweighs 
criminal immigration proceedings. ACLU IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT, ISSUE BRIEF: 
CRIMINALIZING UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 3 fig.1 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
FINAL_criminalizing_undocumented_immigrants_issue_brief_PUBLIC_VERSION.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3EXC-86GK]. Notably, these civil removal proceedings do not afford defendants the 
same constitutional protections as the criminal illegal reentry defendants. Id. at 2. 
108 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a); DENNIS CANDELARIA, IMMIGRATION: DEFENDING AGAINST THE 
ILLEGAL ENTRY AND ILLEGAL REENTRY CHARGES 2, http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/MT08/MT08_
DefendIllegalEntryReenty.pdf [http://perma.cc/GVB6-ZJBS]. 
109 See CANDELARIA, supra note 108, at 2. Mr. Candelaria notes that, absent admission from the 
defendant, proof of alienage is obtainable through a birth certificate, proof of removal is obtainable 
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allocate time to compile the necessary documentation is generally the only 
significant impediment to pursuing illegal reentry convictions. 
Nonetheless, prosecutors rarely pursued illegal reentry charges prior to 
the 1990s, favoring deportation without criminal charges.110 However, 
federal prosecutors have recently begun to increase their enforcement of 
§ 1326. For example, the Department of Justice charged fewer than 2500 
individuals with illegal reentry in 1993, but charged more than 13,000 with 
illegal reentry in 2004.111 This trend has continued as prosecutions reached 
a new high of 37,440 in 2013.112 
Much of this increase has been facilitated by the use of fast-track 
pleas, in which the defendant pleads guilty at the initial appearance in 
exchange for a court-binding sentence recommendation below the 
applicable Sentencing Guideline range.113 By utilizing this efficient form of 
plea bargaining, prosecutors are able to minimize any increase in time or 
resources to pursue illegal reentry convictions. Thus, fast-track plea 
agreements have enabled federal prosecutors to consistently enforce the 
immigration law without negatively impacting their enforcement of other 
criminal statutes. 
With the passage of the PROTECT Act in 2003, Congress officially 
endorsed the use of this plea system by directing the Sentencing 
Commission to define a clear policy for accommodating reduced sentences 
for fast-track pleas.114 Similarly, the Attorney General endorsed the use of 
 
through an I-205 warrant of removal, proof of presence in the United States is obtainable from the 
arresting officer’s report, and proof of nonconsent is obtainable from testimony about the absence of 
documented consent in the immigration databases. Id.; see also United States v. Berrios-Centeno, 
250 F.3d 294, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that several of the federal circuits have construed § 1326 
as a general intent statute by which the requisite mens rea “‘may be inferred by the fact that a defendant 
was previously “deported” . . . and subsequently “found in” the United States,’ without consent” 
(quoting United States v. Hernandez-Landaverde, 65 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (S.D. Tex. 1999))). 
110 See Alan D. Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law Enforcement in the Southern District of 
California, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 254, 254–55 (1996). 
111 United States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014). 
112 Id. This increase in prosecutions has outpaced the increase in Homeland Security’s noncriminal 
deportation actions over the same time period, and has persisted despite an overall decrease in the 
collective number of removal actions by all federal agencies. See JESSICA M. VAUGHAN, CTR. FOR 
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, DEPORTATION NUMBERS UNWRAPPED: RAW STATISTICS REVEAL THE REAL 
STORY OF ICE ENFORCEMENT IN DECLINE 8 tbl.4 (2013), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/Deportation-
Numbers-Unwrapped.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XJ9-3EPG]; cf. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel 
Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-
in-2013 [http://perma.cc/2BB3-JDTS] (documenting an overall increase in Homeland Security 
deportations from 2004 to 2013 of less than 100%). 
113 See Heredia, 768 F.3d at 1225; see also McClellan & Sands, supra note 13, at 523. 
114 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675; Heredia, 768 F.3d at 
1226. 
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the fast-track plea program by creating a nationwide standard for 
defendants’ eligibility for a fast-track plea.115 
B. Heredia’s Extension of Breach Analysis to Fast-Track Pleas 
In Heredia, the Ninth Circuit116 extended its precedent concerning 
implicit breaches to fast-track plea agreements. Mr. Heredia was an alien 
from Mexico who had been previously deported in 1992, 2009, and 2010; 
was found in the United States in 2011; and had not received authorization 
from the Attorney General to reenter the United States.117 As far as the 
record shows, none of these facts have ever been contested by Mr. Heredia. 
The federal prosecutor charged Mr. Heredia with illegal reentry, 
which carried with it a potential maximum penalty of twenty years 
imprisonment due to Mr. Heredia’s criminal history.118 The prosecutor 
offered Mr. Heredia a fast-track plea deal—he pled guilty to criminal 
reentry and waived his right to appeal his conviction in exchange for a 
court-binding sentence recommendation of six months followed by three 
years of supervision.119 
After the PSR was issued for Mr. Heredia, the prosecutor filed a 
sentencing position with the court that affirmatively recommended the 
negotiated sentence, recited some of the information contained in the PSR 
pertaining to Mr. Heredia’s criminal history, and noted that the history 
“communicate[d] a consistent disregard for both the criminal and 
immigration laws of the United States.”120 Defense counsel immediately 
objected, alleging the prosecutor’s inclusion of negative information from 
the PSR implicitly breached the agreement.121 The prosecutor denied 
breaching, but still submitted a supplemental sentencing position 
reaffirming the government’s support of the negotiated sentence.122 
 
115 See Heredia, 768 F.3d at 1226; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to All United States Attorneys, Department Policy on Early Disposition or “Fast-
Track” Programs 2 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/964G-4QK3]. 
116 It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit, encompassing portions of the southwest border, 
handles a substantial portion of the illegal reentry prosecutions every year. See Illegal Reentry Becomes 
Top Criminal Charge, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 10, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251 
[http://perma.cc/4QA3-HGHQ]. Thus, the circuit’s precedent concerning these prosecutions is of 
significant import to the enforcement of illegal reentry generally. 
117 See Heredia, 768 F.3d at 1227–28. 
118 Id. at 1228; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2012). 
119 Heredia, 768 F.3d at 1228–29. 
120 Id. at 1229. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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Ultimately, the court rejected the plea agreement, affirmatively noting 
that the prosecutor’s comments did not influence the court’s rejection.123 
After informing Mr. Heredia that the plea agreement was rejected, the court 
afforded Mr. Heredia the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.124 Mr. 
Heredia declined to withdraw his plea, and after verifying that he was still 
knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty, the court imposed a twenty-one-
month sentence, which is within the Guideline range for Mr. Heredia’s 
offense.125 
Relying on precedent for implicit breaches of non-court-binding plea 
agreements, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor’s sentencing position 
constituted an implicit breach.126 Heredia asserted that the recitation of 
information already contained in the PSR was unnecessary since the court 
already had access to the PSR, and it solely served to undermine the 
sentence recommendation.127 Heredia explicitly rejected the argument that 
the information contained in the sentencing position was necessary to fully 
inform the court of the government’s reasons for requesting supervised 
release.128 
Relying on contract principles, Heredia articulated that since Mr. 
Heredia was induced to enter into the fast-track plea by the offer of a court-
binding recommendation of a lower sentence, the undermining of that 
recommendation constituted a substantial breach that injured the defendant 
by forcing him to sacrifice his Sixth Amendment rights.129 Further, Heredia 
held that an implicit breach is not curable by the prosecutor, and that it is 
an automatic reversible error, demanding vacatur of the conviction and 
remand to a new judge for further proceedings.130 At these proceedings, the 
defendant is afforded the choice of specific performance of the agreement 
or withdrawal of the plea agreement.131 However, it is important to note that 
the Ninth Circuit did not vacate Mr. Heredia’s conviction because he did 
not contest the conviction, only the sentence.132 
 
123 Id. at 1229–30. 
124 Id. at 1230. 
125 Id.; see also infra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
126 See id. at 1231–33 (first citing United States v. Mondragon, 228 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2000); and 
then citing United States v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
127 See id. at 1232–33. 
128 Id. at 1233. 
129 See id. at 1233–34. 
130 Id. at 1235–36. 
131 Id. at 1236–37. 
132 Id. at 1237. 
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IV. EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS AND WISDOM OF HEREDIA’S 
EXTENSION OF IMPLICIT BREACH ANALYSIS 
Heredia’s extension of prior implicit breach analysis to the court-
binding plea agreement context fails to consider key differences between 
the position of defendants that enter into court-binding agreements and 
those that enter into non-court-binding agreements at the time the alleged 
breach occurs. Instead, Heredia superficially examined the potential harm 
suffered by the defendant after dedicating several pages of the published 
opinion to detailing the history of the use of fast-track plea agreements for 
criminal illegal reentry prosecutions, implicitly indicting the practice.133 
Accordingly, this Part contends that a closer look at the disparity in 
these defendants’ positions supports the notion that Heredia’s extension of 
implicit breach analysis unnecessarily restricts prosecutors’ ability to fulfill 
their obligation to inform the court and protect the accuracy of sentencing. 
Further, this Part argues that even if an implicit breach of a court-binding 
plea agreement should be subject to appellate review, the breach should be 
subject to harmless error analysis. 
A. Fast-Track Defendants Do Not Need Heightened Protection 
Defendants who enter into a court-binding plea agreement are not 
subject to the same risks as defendants who enter into non-court-binding 
plea agreements. Heredia implicitly holds that fast-track plea defendants 
and non-court-binding plea defendants are equally vulnerable to potential 
prosecutorial misconduct. However, prosecutors do not have the same 
motive to implicitly breach a fast-track plea agreement as they would for a 
non-court-binding plea agreement, and fast-track plea defendants are not 
exposed to the same potential injury as non-court-binding plea defendants. 
Foremost, a prosecutor lacks any motivation to implicitly breach a 
fast-track plea agreement. In the non-court-binding context, a prosecutor 
could induce a defendant to enter a guilty plea in exchange for a particular 
sentence recommendation even though the prosecutor feels the defendant 
should receive a longer sentence than the recommendation. Then, once the 
defendant’s guilty plea is accepted by the trial court, the prosecutor could 
be motivated to implicitly recommend that the defendant receive a longer 
 
133 Id. at 1224–27 (discussing the role of fast-track pleas as a “cause” in the increase in felony 
prosecutions of illegal aliens). For example, early on in the court’s discussion of fast-track pleas, the 
court felt compelled to highlight that the government “need not go before a grand jury to secure an 
indictment; battle motions, including collateral attacks on the underlying deportation; prosecute a jury 
trial; or oppose an appeal. The defendant, in turn, waives constitutional and other rights and agrees to a 
term of incarceration and, often, a term of supervised release ordinarily discouraged by the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 1224. 
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sentence than the agreed recommendation because the defendant will likely 
be unable to withdraw the plea unless there is an explicit breach of the 
agreement.134 Protection from this type of misconduct is what warrants 
appellate review of the potential subtext of a prosecutor’s sentencing 
comments. 
In contrast, a prosecutor would not have a similar motive in a court-
binding plea context. A court-binding plea defendant is only bound to the 
guilty plea once the trial court accepts the sentence recommendation.135 If 
the court does not accept the recommendation, the defendant reserves the 
right to withdraw the guilty plea.136 Additionally, the prosecutor is only 
precluded from withdrawing the plea agreement when the trial court has 
fully accepted it and imposed a sentence.137 
Accordingly, a prosecutor that wants a longer sentence imposed than 
the one originally agreed to would be better served by withdrawing the 
agreement than intentionally implicitly breaching it. If the prosecutor does 
not withdraw the agreement, the defendant retains the opportunity to 
receive the reduced sentence, regardless of the substance or tenor of the 
prosecutor’s sentencing comments. Meanwhile, if the prosecutor is 
successful in inducing the judge to reject the sentence recommendation, the 
prosecutor has not achieved anything he or she would not have achieved by 
withdrawing the agreement. Thus, the prosecutor runs the risk of having the 
court accept the original sentence recommendation without obtaining any 
benefit. Given this lack of incentive to implicitly breach the agreement, 
defendants are in less need of protection from potential prosecutorial 
misconduct in this context. 
Further, regardless of whether a prosecutor intentionally seeks to 
implicitly breach the plea agreement, court-binding plea agreements 
inherently protect defendants from potential adverse consequences of the 
breach. As noted above, the defendant is not bound by the guilty plea when 
the sentencing court rejects the recommendation. As occurred in Heredia, 
the sentencing judge must clearly inform the defendant that the 
recommended sentence is not being accepted and that the defendant retains 
 
134 Cf. United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1537–38 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that “[h]aving 
chosen to plead guilty, a defendant possesses no absolute right to retract his plea,” listing the factors to 
be considered by the trial court in evaluating a plea withdrawal motion, and emphasizing that a great 
deal of deference should be afforded to the trial court in deciding to reject a plea withdrawal motion); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B) (“[T]he defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not 
follow the recommendation or request.”). 
135 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
136 Id. 11(c)(5)(B). 
137 See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507–08 (1984). 
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the right to withdraw the guilty plea.138 Then, if the defendant still wishes to 
plead guilty, the sentencing judge is obligated to complete another plea 
colloquy—the public courtroom process by which a judge confirms that a 
defendant is entering a plea knowingly and voluntarily—prior to accepting 
the guilty plea.139 In short, defendants are given notice of the effect of the 
implicit breach (that the sentence recommendation is being rejected), 
advised of the right to withdraw the plea, and required to verify their 
understanding of this right. Defendants are thus able to make an informed 
decision to avoid the consequences of the breach and demand a trial. 
Given defendants’ ability to avoid the adverse consequences of the 
breach, prosecutorial conduct that undermines the sentence 
recommendation would only serve to frustrate the efficiency purpose of 
fast-track plea agreements, harming the government’s interest.140 After the 
implicit breach, defendants can force the government to either take them to 
trial, further taxing the government’s limited resources, or to drop the 
charge.141 The government has lost all time and resources dedicated to 
pursuing the original plea agreement, and is now faced with the decision of 
whether to dedicate additional resources to the prosecution of this 
individual at the expense of pursuing other cases. Thus, the breach 
potentially converts the fast-track agreement into the least efficient means 
of prosecuting the case, resulting in damage to the government. 
Overall, defendants who enter into court-binding plea agreements are 
not subject to the same risks as defendants who enter into non-court-
binding plea agreements. Accordingly, there is not a similar justification 
for appellate review of the tenor of prosecutors’ sentencing remarks. 
B. The Extension of Implicit Breach Analysis Unnecessarily Hinders 
Prosecutors’ Duty to Inform the Court 
Given that there is not a similar justification for the application of 
implicit breach analysis to court-binding plea agreements, much more 
 
138 Government’s Answering Brief at 15–16, United States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 
2014) (No. 12-50331); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5). 
139 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). In Heredia, after the sentencing judge informed the defendant he was 
rejecting the sentence recommendation, the judge advised the defendant on two separate occasions of 
the consequences of proceeding with a guilty plea. See Government’s Answering Brief, supra note 138, 
at 16. 
140 See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core 
Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 763 (1998) (discussing Santobello’s 
emphasis of the government’s “interest in the quick and efficient disposition of criminal cases” through 
plea bargaining, which is materially cheaper and quicker than conducting a full jury trial). 
141 While the defendants will still likely be deported based on their immigration status, the desire to 
avoid extended incarceration prior to their deportation provides a significant incentive for them to 
induce the government to drop the criminal illegal reentry charges. 
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weight must be given to the potential costs of extending the analysis to 
court-binding pleas when assessing the soundness of such an extension. 
The greatest potential cost of extending implicit breach analysis may be the 
erosion of prosecutors’ ability to fully inform the sentencing court.142 As 
discussed in Part II, both federal and state courts have emphasized the 
importance of prosecutors serving the interests of the public by ensuring 
that sentencing courts are adequately informed of all provable facts 
relevant to sentencing. In fact, initial attempts by prosecutors to engage in 
plea bargaining in the early nineteenth century were rejected by the courts 
out of fear that the practice would result in information relevant to 
sentencing not being disclosed to the court.143 The concealment of relevant 
information, whether intentional or inadvertent, frustrates the sentencing 
court’s ability to impose consistent and appropriate sentences. This, in turn, 
frustrates the public’s interest in the imposition of fair and just punishment 
for antisocial activity. 
To protect this interest, judges’ ability to make informed decisions and 
retain some sentencing discretion is paramount. Sentencing courts’ ability 
to serve as a check on prosecutorial plea bargaining discretion has already 
been limited by the federal Sentencing Guidelines—judges are limited to 
imposing a sentence within the Guideline range applicable to the charge 
bargain made by the prosecutor.144 This ability will only be further limited 
by eroding prosecutors’ affirmative duty to fully inform the court.145 
 
142 While this Section focuses on the potential cost to prosecutors’ ability to inform the court, 
another notable cost is the potential augmentation of an already overburdened appellate docket. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 63–65 (1996) (discussing the 
need to reform and restructure the circuits to solve their capacity issues caused by a substantial increase 
in the appellate dockets). Many court-binding plea agreements, including fast-track agreements, include 
an appealability waiver, precluding defendants from appealing the sentence imposed. These waivers 
serve to avoid negating the time and resource savings that plea bargaining achieves at the trial level by 
augmenting the appellate docket with challenges to a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. However, 
appealability waivers do not cover plea breaches, whether explicit or implicit. See, e.g., United States v. 
Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1235 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the government’s contention that the 
appealability waiver prohibits the defendant’s ability to challenge the district court’s determination that 
there was not a breach). This means that an extension of implicit breach analysis to court-binding pleas 
will significantly increase the number of criminal defendants who may seek appellate review. In the 
fast-track context alone, this could mean an additional 30,000 defendants or more each year who may 
be able to seek appellate review. See supra Section III.A. 
143 See FISHER, supra note 5, at 114. Fisher notes that judges did not accept plea agreements prior 
to the advent of the PSR process. PSRs detail facts about the defendant’s personal, professional, and 
criminal history, and they describe both the defendant’s and government’s version of the convicted 
offense. Since the PSR is prepared by a disinterested probation officer, Fisher contends that judges felt 
more comfortable accepting plea agreements because the PSR would partially protect the court’s ability 
to impose an informed and appropriate sentence. See id. 
144 See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 
1475 (1993). 
145 See id. at 1497 (noting that Assistant United States Attorneys already have incentives to 
derogate their duty to inform the court). 
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Sentencing judges will be limited to the facially neutral description of facts 
in the PSR and the defense’s characterization of those facts to make a 
sentencing decision and determine if the plea agreement is in the public’s 
best interest. 
The extension of implicit breach analysis erodes prosecutors’ ability to 
fully inform the court by limiting their ability to speak at sentencing out of 
fear of appellate scrutiny. Given the inherent adversarial nature of the 
criminal adjudicatory process, any statement of fact made by the prosecutor 
about the crime or defendant’s criminal history could be perceived as an 
implicit recommendation for a harsh sentence. Therefore, to avoid potential 
scrutiny under appellate review, prosecutors will be constrained to reciting 
the exact sentence recommendation, regardless of whether they possess 
relevant sentencing information not included in the PSR146 or feel 
compelled to explain to the sentencing judge their rationale for agreeing to 
the recommended sentence. 
While this may seem like a hyperbolized description of the potential 
impact, the facts of Heredia illustrate that it is not. In Heredia, the fast-
track agreement included a recommendation for supervised release after the 
term of imprisonment was completed, which is rare for fast-track 
agreements.147 To justify the unusual imposition of supervised release, the 
prosecutor only cited facts about the defendant that were already included 
in the PSR.148 The prosecutor did not include any additional commentary 
about these facts other than iterating that they served as the basis for the 
supervision recommendation.149 Nonetheless, Heredia found this to be an 
implicit breach because, in the appellate court’s opinion, the recitation of 
facts already made available to the sentencing judge via the PSR was 
unnecessary for the trial judge’s evaluation of the recommendation.150 This 
holding essentially cautions prosecutors to assume that judges can infer the 
nexus between the information in the PSR and the prosecutors’ rationale 
for the recommendation to avoid making a comment that implicitly 
 
146 Even if the new relevant information discovered by the prosecutor does not dissuade the 
prosecutor from submitting the plea agreement to the court, the court needs to be apprised of the 
information to permit it to serve as a check on the prosecutor’s discretion. Cf. Memorandum from 
James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors, Department 
Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing 2 (Jan. 28, 2005), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/dag_jan_28_comey_memo_on_booker.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JVZ9-TS7W] (mandating that federal prosecutors disclose “all readily provable 
facts relevant to sentencing” to the court “[t]o ensure that sentences reflect real offense conduct”). 
147 Government’s Answering Brief, supra note 138, at 13. 
148 See id. at 12–13. 
149 See id. 
150 See United States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1234 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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breaches the agreement. In short, it cautions against prosecutors fully 
informing the court. 
Evidence of Heredia’s cautioning effect can be seen in United States 
v. Torres.151 In Torres, the sentencing judge asked the prosecutor if the 
defendant was statutorily eligible for a particular sentence reduction, and 
the prosecutor accurately replied that the defendant was not.152 Citing 
Heredia, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor implicitly breached the 
plea agreement—which included a negotiated sentence recommendation—
by answering the judge’s direct question.153 In response, the prosecutor 
conceded that he implicitly breached the agreement under the Heredia 
standard.154 This concession illustrates that the prosecutor interpreted 
Heredia as abridging his ability to provide information to the sentencing 
court, regardless of the fact that the court directly asked for it. While Torres 
ultimately held that the prosecutor did not implicitly breach the 
agreement,155 it illustrates how Heredia is being interpreted by some 
prosecutors as materially constraining their ability to inform the court. 
While a bright line can be drawn permitting prosecutors to answer 
questions posed by the sentencing court, such a rule does not address the 
situation where the prosecutors’ fulfillment of their duty to inform the court 
is of the greatest import—when the court does not ask a question because it 
is completely unaware of the relevant information. Further, such a rule still 
results in ambiguity concerning the permissible scope and depth of a 
prosecutor’s response to a given question. As a result, Heredia’s 
heightened scrutiny will likely incline prosecutors to provide limited 
responses to sentencing courts’ questions, inhibiting courts’ ability to 
uncover desired information. 
Ultimately, one is left with the question of whether these costs to the 
criminal adjudicatory process are appropriate given the lack of justification 
for appellate review. 
C. Implicit Breaches Should Be Subject to Harmless Error Analysis 
Alternatively, if implicit breach analysis is extended to the court-
binding plea context, it should be subject to harmless error analysis because 
(1) an implicit breach does not undermine the adjudicatory process, (2) an 
 
151 No. 14CR0890-LAB, 2014 WL 7176466 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014). 
152 Id. at *2. 
153 Id. at *3. 
154 Id. at *4. 
155 Id. at *4–5. 
110-3 ARNS MASTER COPY II (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016 11:36 PM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
644 
implicit breach is curable at the trial level, and (3) court-binding pleas can 
be withdrawn. 
As the Supreme Court has iterated numerous times, only structural 
errors that undermine the legitimacy of the entire trial adjudication process 
demand automatic reversal.156 These errors evade harmless error analysis 
because the nature of the error makes its potential impact incalculable, 
rendering any assessment of actual harm impractical. However, in a court-
binding plea agreement context, the implicit breach does not undermine the 
rest of the adjudicatory process. Foremost, even if an implicit breach 
occurs, it is possible for the defendant to receive the benefit conferred by 
the agreement. Also, just as the explicit breach in Puckett did not 
undermine the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty plea, an implicit 
breach of the court-binding plea agreement does not directly affect 
defendants’ ability to knowingly and voluntarily proceed with their guilty 
plea. Accordingly, if an appellate court determines that there was an 
implicit breach, the appellate court can assess if the breach proved harmful 
by independently assessing if the subsequent decision to proceed with the 
guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. 
Also like Puckett, an implicit breach is curable at the trial level. In 
Puckett, the Court held that an explicit breach may be curable by objecting 
and demanding specific performance by the prosecutor.157 To the same 
extent that an explicit breach is curable, an implicit breach is curable by a 
demand for specific performance at sentencing. In Heredia, after the 
defendant objected to the prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum, the 
prosecutor attempted to cure any alleged implicit breach by filing a 
supplemental memorandum that asserted that the government 
unequivocally supported the agreed-to sentence recommendation. Under a 
Puckett analysis, this is sufficient to render the breach harmless. 
Furthermore, even if the prosecutor did not attempt to cure the breach, 
court-binding plea agreements have a built-in remedy that affords 
defendants the opportunity to avoid harm from the breach. After defendants 
are placed on notice by the sentencing court that the sentence 
recommendation is not going to be accepted, giving them a clear indication 
that a harsher punishment will be imposed with a guilty plea, defendants 
have the ability to return to the same position they were in prior to entering 
the plea agreement—they can withdraw their plea and proceed to trial. 
Since defendants do not have a right to plea bargain, they are not 
 
156 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1967). 
157 556 U.S. 129, 140–42 (2009). 
ARNS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016 11:36 PM 
110:617 (2016) Not All Plea Breaches Are Equal 
645 
prejudiced by having to go to trial.158 Thus, as long as they are returned to 
the same position as before the agreement, the breach would be harmless. 
Ultimately, an implicit breach of a court-binding plea agreement is not 
the type of error that defies harmless error analysis. Therefore, it should not 
warrant automatic reversal on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In summation, Heredia serves as a potentially dangerous extension of 
implicit breach analysis. The increased level of scrutiny that Heredia 
supports is likely to dissuade prosecutors from making sentencing remarks 
that serve to inform the sentencing court, impeding the court’s ability to 
impose an informed and appropriate sentence. Given that defendants are 
not likely to be subjected to unfair prejudice as a result of an implicit 
breach, the cost of this higher level of scrutiny is not offset by a gain in 
terms of protecting defendants. 
It is important to note that the defendant in Heredia never contested 
his guilt. The defendant concedes that he was guilty, and he was sentenced 
within the Sentencing Guidelines established by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission for the offense he committed. His only objection was that he 
was not given a sentence well below the minimum sentence he was 
statutorily eligible for. Essentially, he was asserting that he had a right to 
plea bargain, and Heredia affirmed this new right. 
  
 
158 While criminal defendants may forego certain benefits by having to go to trial—e.g., a possible 
two-level sentence reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines for accepting responsibility, see U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014)—loss of these benefits 
does not frustrate any of the defendants’ rights.  
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